U.S. President Donald Trump’s announcement, made alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, that he would engage in talks with Iran sparked global attention. Many analysts viewed this as a pragmatic move, noting that Trump, “as a businessman,” preferred negotiations over military action. The fact that the announcement came immediately after a meeting with Netanyahu added significance.
Meanwhile, Iran, aware of shifting post-Oct. 7 dynamics, recalibrated its policies, anticipating an Israeli strike. The stark contrast between late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s rhetoric clearly reflects this shift. Pezeshkian’s rise, despite having been previously vetoed by the Guardian Council in the last parliamentary elections, and Mohammad Javad Zarif’s brief reentry into politics, as a key figure during the 2015 nuclear deal, underline Tehran’s strategic repositioning in the face of mounting threats.
Even when Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas, was killed in the middle of Tehran, Iran avoided reacting. Pezeshkian specifically emphasized in his U.N. statements that they do not want war or conflict. Indeed, Iran did not make any significant move until Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s death. They were forced to act with the complete elimination of Hezbollah’s A-team and Nasrallah’s death, but they gave a highly controlled response. Although Iran sent a message to Israel through these attacks that their missiles could reach Israel and could “inflict pain” if tensions escalated, it appears to be an insufficient response from Israel’s perspective. Throughout the process, regardless of what happened, Israel responded to all steps taken by Iran to de-escalate tensions with another attack; Israel did not allow Iran’s flexible policies to yield results.
Israel gains upper hand
Before the Oct. 7 attacks, Iranians were very confident that they had surrounded Israel. There was a belief that if Israel made the slightest move, the structure they conceptualized as the “Axis of Resistance” would respond to Israel in a unified manner. Indeed, Israel appeared to be surrounded by Hamas from the south, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Syria’s Assad regime from the north, the Houthis from Yemen and other militia groups in Iraq.
Using the Oct. 7 attacks as leverage, the Israeli government first destroyed Hamas’ strike capacity at the cost of genocide and ignored all internal vulnerabilities within Israel. Subsequently, moves were made to leave Iran struggling with its internal problems, and incidents occurred that made the Iranian leadership doubt the strength of Mossad networks within Iran. Thus, Iran was prevented from taking bold steps.
Throughout 2024, many middle and lower-ranking Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members died suspiciously in Iran, a terrorist attack occurred in Kerman, several facilities experienced sabotage and explosions, the country’s president and foreign ministers died under suspicious circumstances and a VIP guest who had come for a one-night stay was assassinated while under special protection in Tehran. After the Mahsa Amini protests, objections in Parliament regarding the de facto reality that people were no longer wearing headscarves and a related bill were blocked by the Supreme National Security Council.
After Oct. 7, there was concern that Hezbollah would join from the north and attack Israel. Villages had been evacuated due to intense missile attacks, and Israel conducted operations against Lebanon through these evacuated villages and incoming missile attacks, largely destroying Hezbollah’s strike capacity within two months. Throughout all this, there had been tension between the Assad regime and Iran in Syria for some time, and Damascus fell at a pace that surprised even the opposition. Thus, Iran lost the logistical lines to Lebanese Hezbollah along with Syria.
In Iraq, significant steps are being taken to rebuild the central government. Groups close to Iran in Iraq, particularly due to Iran’s indifference following Hezbollah’s fate, appear reluctant to jump into the fire for Iran. Iraq’s internal dynamics and threats from Israel also constrain the politics these groups pursue. In summary, only the Houthi groups in Yemen remained. Since the distance of the Houthis from Israel is similar to Tehran’s distance from Israel, operations conducted there provide important information about operations that might be conducted against Iran. Indeed, following the U.S. military deployments to the region in recent weeks, Houthi targets have been largely destroyed, and the Houthis have largely ceased to be a threat.
Expectations of each side
In short, Iran was forced to the table, and both the Israeli and U.S. sides know this. At the beginning of the process, Iran was not the party seeking an agreement; on the contrary, those in the country who wanted an agreement had been pushed out of the political arena. They were not allowed to say anything. At the point reached today, Iranians are saying that the U.S. could invest in Iran as long as they do not engage in espionage activities. However, it remains a fact that any concessions Iran makes from this point forward will be contingent.
The Israelis, on the other hand, interpret any agreement as “tying Israel’s security to the conjuncture.” In other words, they don’t want to leave it to chance whether a new Mahmoud Ahmadinejad might come to power in Iran 15 years from now, after Iran has made significant advances in both missile technologies and nuclear technology. Therefore, intervention in Iran is the only option on the table for Israel. The Iranians, on the other hand, are considering the possibility that Israel might be restrained by Trump through reaching an agreement with him. However, looking at what happened to the Oslo process and its actors, what happened to the JCPOA, and the outcomes of many other issues in recent history, this doesn’t seem very likely.
Israel cannot give up ‘Begin Doctrine’
For Israel, preventing countries in its surroundings (especially hostile countries) from possessing nuclear technology is of vital importance. The approach of Menachem Begin, one of the iconic figures of the Israeli right and founder of the Likud Party, which has entered the literature as the “Begin Doctrine,” is based on a security understanding that aims to eliminate the possibility of a state that Israel considers an enemy obtaining nuclear weapons before it materializes. The 1981 airstrike on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq was the first clear application of this understanding. In his statement after the operation, Begin argued that when Israel’s security is at stake, action should be taken without hesitation. Similarly, the 2007 attack on Syria’s Al-Kibar nuclear reactor is also a product of this understanding.
Three fundamental assumptions underlie this doctrine. The first is Israel’s geographical smallness and vulnerability. Israel is a state that is both limited in terms of area and fragile in terms of population density; this situation makes the country extremely sensitive to a possible nuclear attack. Secondly, Israel’s security approach does not include a “second strike” option; in other words, it does not have the strategic luxury of retaliating after a threat has materialized. Therefore, the preemptive strike approach is seen not as a choice but as a necessity for Israel. Finally, the doctrine aims to prevent nuclear proliferation on a regional scale.
Any enemy country in the Middle East possessing nuclear weapons weakens Israel’s strategic deterrence and dramatically disrupts regional power balances against Israel. The Begin Doctrine has been shaped as a proactive security paradigm aimed at stopping such developments while they are still in their initial stages. Therefore, as long as Iran does not completely end its nuclear activities and accept the Libyan model, Israel will continue to view Iran’s work as an existential threat.
What is on horizon?
Iran is aware of the approaching threat. It doesn’t want what happened to Baghdad in 1991 to happen to it. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq lost all its infrastructure within a week and existed in isolation in a severe crisis until 2003. The Iranians, from their experience in the Iran-Iraq War, know well what it means to lose infrastructure and how long it takes to replace it; therefore, they understand what the threat means. Today, Iran already faces numerous problems, ranging from water issues to energy crises. Such an issue would shake the foundations in Iran. For this reason, the Iranians are looking for an honorable exit and a basis for agreement. However, 45 years of rhetoric, approach, and the boundaries drawn by ideology significantly limit this flexibility.
For now, Iran can give up the nuclear bomb and open its facilities for inspection as transparently as possible, but since every promise it gives will be read as “conjunctural,” it doesn’t seem likely to establish trust. Similarly, it’s not possible for the regime to completely give up nuclear technology. Because at this point, all the people who were killed would have died in vain, all the hardships endured would have been for nothing, and all the sanctions resisted would have been in vain. In other words, this would mean defeat. It is precisely for this reason that Iranians expect a “fair agreement” from the other side.
Since the 1980s, Iranians have claimed that the “proxies” are independent resistance forces that have nothing to do with them. A similar rhetoric was developed for Hezbollah’s activities. However, on the other side of the coin, Iranian IRGC officer Qasem Soleimani was indicating that they were “governing capitals.” For nuclear technology, the Iranian side states that they consider nuclear weapons “haram” as per Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s decree. They say they produce ballistic missiles for defensive, not offensive, purposes. But still, each of these is an existential threat to Israel. The word “existential” plays a pivotal role here.
For Israel, rather than dealing with these threats separately, initiating a process that would lead to regime change in Iran would mean solving all these problems at their root. Because having lost all critical infrastructure and being unable to supply electricity, water, and energy, the Iranians will have neither the time nor the capacity to organize their proxy forces, rebuild nuclear facilities, or enhance their missile capabilities. So, whether Iran agrees with Trump or not, from Israel’s perspective, there is only one solution to the issue. However, at this point, Pandora’s box will have been opened.