In the changing landscape of the Middle East and South Caucasus, one fact is becoming hard to deny: Türkiye is steadily gaining ground, while Iran appears to be slipping into strategic fatigue. From Syria to the Caucasus, recent shifts have revealed Tehran’s shrinking influence and Ankara’s growing command over regional developments.
Azerbaijan’s military gains in 2020 and 2023, both backed by Türkiye, redrew not only borders but alliances. With Türkiye providing equipment, intelligence and coordination, Azerbaijan reclaimed its internationally recognized territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which had been under Armenian occupation since the early 1990s despite multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions. This disrupted the existing order and weakened Iran’s long-favored partner, Armenia. For Tehran, which aligned itself with Yerevan despite cultural and religious mismatch, the outcome has been difficult to manage.
It was already a curious position in the 1990s, when during the first Karabakh war, Iran supported Christian Armenia over Shiite Muslim Azerbaijan. That decision has lingered as a contradiction in its claims of pan-Shiite unity. Today, its regional calculations still baffle even internal observers.
At the center of present tensions is the proposed Zangezur Corridor, a land link between mainland Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhchivan, running through southern Armenia. For Türkiye and Azerbaijan, this project offers regional connectivity and strategic depth. For Iran, it threatens the loss of its only direct land route to Armenia. From a legal standpoint, the corridor builds upon Azerbaijan’s right to access its own exclave through peaceful and cooperative transit. While Armenia retains sovereign control, international law supports negotiated transit arrangements that promote regional stability and lawful access between non-contiguous parts of a state.
Iran’s response has lacked clarity. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s trip to Yerevan seemed more performative than solution-oriented. Tehran is struggling to stay relevant in a game others are already shaping. Meanwhile, Türkiye and Azerbaijan continue to define the region’s logistics future.
Shared past, divided present
Beyond diplomatic setbacks, Iran faces a deeper challenge: its internal demographics. Independent estimates suggest Turkic-speaking populations, including those of Azerbaijani origin, make up 25 to 30% of Iran’s population. Some believe the actual figure is even higher. While Tehran avoids ethnic-based censuses, the Turkic presence is significant and rising.
Despite their numbers, these citizens remain sidelined in public life. Even with a president of Azerbaijani background, little has changed. Symbolism, many argue, substitutes for meaningful representation. Longstanding demands for mother-tongue education and fairer access to public institutions remain unmet.
Türkiye’s influence among these groups is undeniable. In cities like Tabriz and Urmia, Turkish media and language resonate strongly. This soft power, built through shared heritage rather than pressure, is gradually reshaping Iran’s northwest cultural identity. Other Turkic groups, such as the ones in Khorasan, add to this picture. Around Mashhad, their population is estimated at over 800,000. Though less politically vocal, they strengthen Türkiye’s cultural reach inside Iran.
This influence is rooted in both cultural ties and historical continuity. Modern Iran’s territory served as a key passage and settlement zone during the westward migration of Turkic peoples. The Seljuks and Ottomans, though Central Asian in origin, passed through the Iranian plateau en route to Anatolia. That memory still resonates, especially among Iranian Turks who view themselves as part of a larger civilizational story. In today’s Iran, especially during times of political strain, individuals of Azerbaijani origin are not only part of the system but often take on roles seen as stabilizing its core.
Law, power, legitimacy
From a legal perspective, current shifts in the South Caucasus reflect core international law principles. Türkiye’s support for Azerbaijan, its engagement with Armenia and its corridor initiatives remain broadly consistent with sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention. These efforts rest on mutual consent and respect for borders. Regional actors unable to adapt to this legal structure risk not just strategic isolation but normative ambiguity.
Iran’s weakness is not only in the South Caucasus. In recent nuclear talks with the U.S., it has suggested steps it once rejected, like sending enriched uranium to another country or sharing control of its nuclear sites.
Türkiye stands out through a purpose-driven strategy. Ankara grounds its foreign policy in diplomacy, transit integration and regional partnerships. Iran, in contrast, clings to outdated alignments and ideological language, expecting past tactics to remain effective.
In Nagorno-Karabakh, Türkiye aligned diplomacy with military coordination, gaining outcomes on both fronts. It is now open to engagement with Armenia, conditional on Baku’s approval and Yerevan’s sincerity. These are not gestures, but forward steps toward regional normalization.
Iran, meanwhile, failed to act when its partner needed it. It failed to halt the Zangezur plan. It continues to lose diplomatic standing and credibility. While Türkiye advances corridors and promotes dialogue, Iran issues warnings with limited impact.
Armenia is adjusting. It has signed new agreements with the U.S. and enhanced its relations with the EU. The shift in Yerevan’s tone is noticeable, and Türkiye, rather than Tehran, is increasingly viewed as part of the region’s future. This is not just policy evolution; it marks realignment.
Tehran’s critics warn of Turkish dominance. But what Türkiye is constructing is pragmatic: regional trade, infrastructure and diplomatic weight built on action, not ideology. Iran still speaks a language many in the region no longer prioritize.
Its greater challenge may be internal. Iran’s Turkic population is young, sizable and increasingly aware of its distinct identity. This trend suggests not only social friction but also potential transformation. Ignoring it won’t make it disappear. Türkiye doesn’t need to provoke; its cultural influence is already in motion.
The bottom line is this: Türkiye is delivering on both diplomatic and strategic fronts. Iran, in contrast, shows neither the flexibility nor initiative required in today’s geopolitical climate. Influence no longer rests in slogans but in results. Türkiye appears to understand this. Iran remains stalled in the habits of a past that no longer commands the region’s future.