On Jan. 20, Donald Trump will move into the White House, promising radical change in many areas.
Yes, in his first term between 2016 and 2020, Trump was unable to bring about radical changes in the areas he promised. This was because the military-civilian bureaucracy resisted him, and the pro-democratic center media conducted an intense anti-Trump propaganda campaign. Even his party did not stand united behind him against the opposition.
This time, however, we are dealing with a more experienced Trump. He knows more about problem areas and black holes. He has succeeded in pushing back the center media, which he calls “fake news.” He has Elon Musk, the boss of social media and the so-called “new media,” on his side. Above all, this time, Trump has a majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Republican Party is also behind him now and the opposition, which was united in a bloc against Trump last term with the support of the state apparatus, is now in shambles.
In which areas of foreign policy is Trump aiming for radical changes, and how might these processes affect Türkiye-U.S. relations?
Seemingly, the first address of change will be NATO. Trump believes the United States is carrying NATO’s burden. Türkiye, a member of the pact guarding its most critical southeastern border, has the second-largest army and has met its goal of allocating at least 2% of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense. Yet, it is being deprived of the most basic rights of membership. It is subjected to a de facto embargo on issues such as F-35s, modernization of F-16s or air defense systems. Trump’s moves to change the current functioning of NATO should worry those in charge in Brussels, not Türkiye.
Likewise, difficult times await the EU. Trump sees the EU as a useless burden. He wants to see individual actors, not pacts. He believes that such a relationship model would eliminate bureaucracy and make it easier to solve problems. Trump’s approach to the EU, which has stalled Türkiye for 60 years, poses no problem for Ankara; on the contrary, it offers opportunities.
Another issue is Türkiye’s place in the U.S.’ Syria policy. Trump, who openly said that Obama created Daesh, gave his generals three months in his first term to finish the job and leave Syria. In the new circumstances following the revolution in Syria, he may withdraw the U.S. military presence from the region, which he considers useless for his country. Türkiye, as the only state fighting against Daesh on the ground, may establish closer relations with the U.S. in the new period.
Of course, I am not saying that with Trump, the environment for Türkiye will turn into a rose garden without thorns. After all, both Trump and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are leaders struggling to make their countries stronger and more advantageous. It is normal for Turkish and U.S. interests to clash at times, as they have in the past. For example, Israel will be the most complicated issue between Ankara and Washington in the coming period. But as long as the dialogue between Erdoğan and Trump, who have demonstrated a sincere will to conduct diplomacy, is not interrupted, there is no problem that the two countries cannot reconcile.