Replacing the US nuclear umbrella-a cornerstone of transatlantic security for more than seven decades-would be an exceptionally daunting task for Europe, according to a leading expert.
Europe’s renewed discussions about nuclear capabilities stem from significant shifts in global strategic dynamics, with the most significant being the new US administration’s focus on Asia-Pacific and its push to redistribute responsibilities within NATO, Tomas Nagy, a senior research fellow on nuclear, space, and missile defense at the GLOBSEC think tank, told Anadolu.
“The catalyst was US Secretary of State Pete Hegseth’s statement at the NATO defense ministers’ meeting in February, signaling that the US would need to make tough strategic choices, including reducing its force posture in Europe,” he said.
“Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference further highlighted deep political divisions between the Trump administration and what I would call the European mainstream,” said Nagy, who previously served as a diplomat with experience in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.
This has sparked a “sense of uncertainty in Europe and you can see that Europe is rethinking the way it should approach defending itself,” he added.
Underscoring how the Ukraine war has highlighted the continent’s vulnerability regarding nuclear deterrence, he said Europe’s initial hesitation to supply Kyiv with advanced military systems, such as cruise missiles and aircraft, due to fear of provoking nuclear escalation with Russia, revealed a crucial gap in its strategic capabilities.
“Nuclear weapons won’t guarantee stability or solve every security issue, but they seem to be a useful tool to manage escalation, and Europe is actually afraid to end up without a robust and credible nuclear deterrent,” he explained.
– Macron’s moment?
French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent proposal to extend his country’s nuclear umbrella across Europe may appear attractive at face value, but Nagy warned it faces considerable practical and political obstacles.
Implementing such an ambitious plan would require long-term political stability and broad consensus in France, as well as within potential European host countries, along with substantial financial investment, he said.
“France’s nuclear arsenal was developed to serve its core national security interests during and after the Cold War, not to provide extended deterrence for others,” Nagy noted.
Deploying French nuclear warheads in other European nations would also need complex legal agreements, extensive technical infrastructure, and carefully structured bilateral arrangements.
“France would need bilateral agreements with host countries and consultation mechanisms for participating nations. Like the US, France would likely retain full control and custody over its warheads,” Nagy explained.
Paris is strategically positioning itself as an essential voice in shaping Europe’s future security architecture by leveraging its unique status as a nuclear power, Nagy added.
– Potential hosts: Poland, Germany and more
Nagy pointed out that even hosting nuclear weapons would demand domestic unity and consensus, as political volatility could disrupt long-term security commitments and potentially undermine credibility.
“Poland stands out because its two major parties agree on pursuing a greater role in nuclear deterrence,” Nagy explained.
“However, Poland isn’t waiting for a European nuclear umbrella. It seeks a stronger role within NATO’s existing framework and has signaled interest in hosting nuclear capabilities, though progress depends on US leadership.”
He also noted that the Trump administration, focused predominantly on Asia-Pacific challenges, might perceive Poland’s nuclear ambitions as a complication rather than an asset.
Instead, the US might prefer involving Poland and other interested European nations more deeply in NATO’s nuclear planning processes without actual warhead deployments, he said.
Germany, as another significant NATO member, could also emerge as a key candidate under certain political conditions, Nagy suggested.
“Under a new conservative chancellor like Friedrich Merz, Germany could adopt a more ambitious stance. It has the financial resources and conventional forces to integrate nuclear weapons. However, uncertainty about future governments remains a significant hurdle,” he said.
He added that Belgium and Italy, already hosting US nuclear weapons under NATO agreements, might similarly consider involvement in any future French-led nuclear arrangements.
– Risks of nuclear proliferation
Regarding the risk that Europe’s insecurity could spur some nations toward developing independent nuclear programs, Nagy conceded that such scenarios cannot be dismissed entirely, especially if the existing global nuclear framework anchored by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) continues to deteriorate.
“If the UK and France are unwilling or unable to share their arsenals, or if their proposals lack credibility, some European states might consider autonomous nuclear programs, despite the complexity, cost, and time required,” he said.
However, Nagy cautioned that nuclear proliferation within Europe could destabilize the already fragile global nuclear order and prompt wider international consequences, potentially leading other states worldwide to pursue nuclear arms.
“If the US, UK, and France cannot prevent European allies from developing nuclear weapons, why would Russia or China refrain from sharing their nuclear technology with their allies?” he said.
He emphasized that despite growing uncertainties, nuclear proliferation within Europe remains improbable for now, as major nuclear powers-particularly the US, Russia, and China-would likely prevent such destabilizing developments.
“Europe’s collective security might weaken if the US withdraws, as Europeans couldn’t compensate quickly enough. Still, I don’t foresee European states pursuing full nuclear programs in the near future,” Nagy concluded.