The decadelong Syrian stalemate has just turned out to be Iran’s biggest conundrum that will take years for Iran to fix. Since the fall of Aleppo in 2016, Iran had three scenarios in hand. First, they enjoyed a triumphalist policy that excluded the defeated, pressing for even greater military gain with the help of Russian military might. Iran tirelessly worked to expand its military footprints across Syria to the Lebanese border, apparently to be ready for an eventual confrontation with Israel. Iran knew that the promises of the Astana Peace Process, to proceed with constitutional reform and an internationally monitored election in Syria, could be used to buy more time to strengthen Bashar Assad’s grip on power. From the position of strength, Iran engaged with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to mend ties and get the Assad regime back to the Arab League. The victorious Iran and the Assad regime presented themselves as a counter to the Turkish influence in the region. Bashar Assad was received by the Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman, joined the Arab League summit and visited Gulf capitals.
Iran, however, failed to work on another scenario: to rebuild Syria and its economy to strengthen both Assad and Syria’s war-torn economy. Despite the end of the active war and the deconfliction mechanism in place, major Syrian cities like Aleppo, Hama and Homs remained in ruin with no hope for the remaining local population to restart a new life. Amid no signs of rebuilding and the return of everyday civic life, the displaced Syrians had little incentive to return to their cities. While Iran was happy to see Syria as an ideological and military asset, the Syrians, both inside Syria and refugees, abhorred Iran’s one-sided role.
A ruined country, disenchanted population and crippling state institutions were not noticeable in the glare of military gains. Eight years were not a short time to bring new hopes to the Syrians who faced massive xenophobia in Europe and elsewhere. Assad was managing a state reduced to a family business run by his loyal family members, sectarian militia, with Syrian people remaining excluded and marginalized. The statement from Assad’s former foreign minister, Faisal Miqdad and Assad’s envoy in Moscow, Bashar Al Jafri, now blame the failure of state building.
Iran had rarely taken the third scenario seriously: the Astana Peace Process, which promised to accommodate both Assad and his opponents through a negotiated deal. However, the track record of the Astana Peace Process since 2017 suggests that Iran failed to convince Bashar Assad to engage with the opposition for a meaningful outcome. The Astana Peace Process was stalled and then a new initiative between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin was agreed upon, known as the Sochi Declaration, apparently to open direct communication between Türkiye and Bashar Assad.
With missed opportunities, Bashar Assad blundered to have rejected Erdogan’s call for a dialogue to find a solution to the Syrian crisis. When the rebels confronted Assad’s indiscriminate bombings in late November 2024, the Assad regime fell like a house of cards. It was immediately abandoned by his closest aides and officers, who were already exhausted from long-drawn battles.
Iranians are known for their astute diplomatic skills and negotiated peace. However, in the case of Syria, Iran missed opportunity after opportunity. What could be the most logical interpretation for such a gigantic failure? The undignified fall of Assad is no less than an earthquake in the regional strategic landscape and a coup against Iran’s regional alliance.
What exactly caused those miscalculations in Iran’s Syria policy? Has Iran lost the game in Syria? And how could Iran revise a new Syria policy?
Iran’s power centers are at odds with each other as the grip of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has declined and the struggle for power between the reformists and conservatives is widening more than ever. The reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian came to power with a declared commitment to engage with the West and seek ease on sanctions. Khamenei and his military aides are busy with the ongoing Israeli war in Gaza and Lebanon, where Iran-supported groups have faced a huge debacle.
The post-Assad statements from Khamenei and the government carry contradictory sentiments and frustration. While Khamenei condemns the entire episode and rejects it as an American conspiracy, the foreign minister sends mixed signals. Never was Iran’s Syria policy so divided, distracted and disoriented. People close to the Assad regime now complain that the new Iranian government favored direct communication between Bashar Assad and Erdoğan to find common ground. Iranian officials are expressing their anger against Assad for not accepting Iranian advice.
Iran has kept all its eggs in one basket, so it has no Syria policy. It has neither engaged with the new Syrian authorities nor been invited by any regional initiative on Syria, including last week’s Riyadh meeting attended by Arab and European diplomats. In the absence of a plan B, Iran faces isolation from Syria and the West sees this as an opportunity to keep Iran away from Syria and Lebanon. The newly elected president of Lebanon has also warned Hezbollah and Iran to disarm, in a further blow to Iranian assets in the region. Iraq has demonstrated a more pragmatic approach and reached out to Damascus to receive necessary assurances on mutual security.
What is left for Iran now is to find a channel to engage with the new Syrian authorities and join a regional initiative. Iran’s regional allies, mainly Iraq, remain under immense American pressure against sending Iran-supported militias to Syria. Most Syrian regime soldiers are surrendering to receive general amnesty and former Assad loyalists, such as Assad’s Russia envoy Bashar al Jaffary, are reaching out to Damascus to seek a new chance.
It does not look easy for the new Syrian administration to show generosity and forgiveness. On the contrary, there are fears that the new Syrian administration might go further in starting the trial of Bashar Assad and his close aides for various accounts of crimes against Syrian people, which may implicate several Iranian military officers then active in Syria.
Türkiye is actively facilitating international and regional support for the new administration in Damascus. In return, Türkiye is mainly focusing on clearing north Syria from PKK/YPG and preventing Syria’s partition on ethnic or sectarian lines. While few Iranian statements see the presence of PKK/YPG in Syria as an opportunity against the new Syrian regime, Türkiye has made it clear to the international community that it will not allow any other entity or armed group to function outside the Syrian state and the new Syrian army. The Astana Peace Process still binds Iran, Russia and Türkiye to help build a new Syria based on an inclusive and non-sectarian constitution. As the U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s administration starts, Iran’s confrontational politics will only isolate and weaken its remaining influence in the region.