The specter of Iran looms over relations between Iraq and Syria. Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa will not attend the 34th Arab League summit in the Iraqi capital Baghdad on May 17, after Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed S. Al Sudani’s invitation spurred controversy over his background, since he once fought and was jailed in Iraq. Syria’s delegation to the summit will be headed by Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani.
While the fact that Al Sudani’s invitation was met with aggression from pro-Iran Shiite leaders signals a tense future for Baghdad-Damascus ties, it also shows Iran’s capacity to manipulate the relations of Iraq and its neighbors. Furthermore, it seems that the Iranian obstacle to the establishment of a new Syria will not fade.
Insistence of geopolitical reality
Syria and Iraq are near siblings with key shared experiences – such as artificial state construction under imperialism, Baathist authoritarian regimes and pressure from U.S. and Iran hegemony. Despite responding in quite different ways, this hybrid reality has placed both at the epicenter of regional chaos for years.
Baghdad-Damascus relations, which had experienced major crises since 1979, began to enter a normalization phase in 2006. Iraq supported regional initiatives to reintegrate into the Arab world under the Assad regime, marking a desire to upgrade official relations. However, Iraqi Shiite militia groups, which were involved in the Syrian civil war with Iran, lost their power in the country under the new Sunni Damascus administration that came to power with the regional earthquake that started in Gaza in October 2023. While regional and Western countries quickly adapted to the new situation in Syria, Iraq’s abstentionist attitude drew attention. Al-Shaara, who has made rapid progress with the Sunni-majority Gulf Arab countries and Türkiye, has not yet found what he hoped for in Shiite-majority Iraq.
But under the pressure of regional diplomacy, al-Shibani visited Baghdad in March to hold talks with the Iraqi counterpart. Then, al-Sharaa and Al Sudani held their first talks in Doha in April under the auspices of Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. The meeting represents a landmark moment for Iraqi-Syrian relations and also for the broader post-Assad regional landscape.
Anger of Iran-backed groups
Al-Sharaa, who fought on the side of al-Qaida in Iraq after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, was jailed for five years in Iraq before being released in 2011 due to a lack of evidence. He later founded al-Qaeia’s Syrian affiliate and then Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in 2016, the group that worked with opposition forces to overthrow the Assad regime.
Al Sudani’s invitation to al-Sharaa to the summit last month angered Iraqi militia groups and a significant portion of the Shiite community. Several powerful Iraqi actors, such as former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a leading member of Iraq’s main pro-Iran coalition and powerful Iran-backed militias factions such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and Kataib Sayyid Shuhada (KSS) have voiced opposition to al-Sharaa’s planned visit. KH’s Hoquq parliamentary bloc issued an official letter to the attorney-general to take legal action against al-Sharaa if he comes to Iraq. Moreover, around 60 Shiite lawmakers in the 329-seat parliament petitioned the government to ban al-Sharaa from attending the summit.
In contrast, Iraqi Sunni politicians have viewed al-Sharaa’s participation in the summit positively, as a step toward pulling Iraq away from Iran and toward Arab states. Also, some Syrians worried that al-Sharaa might face danger in Iraq. It is noteworthy that al-Sharaa’s handgun attracted attention during his meeting with the head of Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS), Hamid al-Shatri, in Damascus in January. Despite Iraqi officials’ rejection, there were allegations that al-Sharaa could be arrested if he attended the summit. In reality, Al Sudani is acting in accordance with the regional reality, but the real bosses of the government in Iraq still are not eager to accept the new reality in Damascus.
Iran considers Iraqi Shiite militias as the last stronghold after the fall of the Assad regime and Israel’s weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. In last December, just days after the fall of the Assad regime, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed that “Syrian youth would defeat” the new order of Syria. Since then, Tehran’s rhetoric toward al-Sharaa’s administration has become increasingly aggressive. Some militia figures feel obligated to back their Iranian patron’s opposition to al-Sharaa, who ousted a former client Syrian regime. Iran does not want a successful relationship between Syria and Iraq because it further weakens its proxy network.
‘Syria’ as an election apparatus
Elections are scheduled to be held in Iraq on Nov. 11. The rivals – such as al-Maliki and Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AHH), also known as the Khazali Network –most disturbed by Al Sudani’s second term in office are also undermining normalization with Damascus. Al-Sharaa’s failure to attend the summit in person is an indication that militia groups have been able to limit Al Sudani’s normalization process with Syria, especially ahead of the upcoming elections. For Al Sudani, who does not have a strong party or a strong support base but has announced that he will run for a second term, taking on pro-Iran Iraqi militia groups could undermine his ability to secure a second term.
Both the new regional reality and Al Sudani’s efforts may not be enough to establish relations with Syria. It is clear that he is aware that he will not be able to achieve success despite the pro-Iran actors, but he is also trying to establish a balanced platform with Damascus without giving up his status. Indeed, during his last visit to Ankara, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s praise for Iraq’s relations with Syria and Al Sudani’s role signals a path of balance through relations with Ankara. It is not difficult to predict that, in Al Sudani’s possible second term, relations with Damascus will be stronger than those of a pro-Iran actor.
What will be the choice?
U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent meeting with al-Sharaa in Saudi Arabia and his announcement that sanctions will be lifted will strengthen Syria’s acceptance in the regional and global scene. The Iraqi Foreign Ministry’s rapid statement of satisfaction with Trump’s move is valuable in terms of Baghdad’s emphasis on the necessity of relations with Damascus, despite the obstacles. Moreover, Al Sudani’s meetings with al-Sharaa and al-Shibani and Syria’s participation in the Baghdad summit indicate that Iran and its affiliated Iraqi militia groups have failed to completely prevent the Baghdad-Damascus normalization. The fact that pro-Iran Iraqi groups only target al-Sharaa personally due to his controversial past and are unable to prevent visits at the foreign minister level shows that they cannot be decisive in the course of Iraqi-Syrian relations but are trying to satisfy their followers.
The Middle East is evolving into new geopolitics. Israel’s attacks on Gaza, the regime change in Syria, the Trump administration’s approach to the region, and nuclear negotiations with a fragile Iran keep the region in a pendulum of uncertainty and opportunity. In this picture, Iraq can be a country that establishes balance, rather than being a passive and weak actor as in the past. Therefore, Iraq’s contribution to the integration of the new Syria into the international community will be in its best interest. The fact that pro-Iran groups, currently in the spotlight of the U.S. and Israel, insist on not accepting the new Damascus administration means drawing more anger from the U.S. and regional countries and further isolation.