If U.S. President Donald Trump is synonymous with tariffs, Ukraine is all about security guarantees and for good reason, as it learned the hard way. But what exactly are security guarantees? Why do some work while others fail? And why is Ukraine, caught between Western powers and Russia, urgently demanding stronger protections?
This isn’t just about Ukraine. The same question echoes in places like Gaza: when powerful nations act with impunity and international organizations are disregarded, how can smaller states defend themselves?
In a world where international agreements are frequently violated and powerful countries manipulate international law, smaller nations like Ukraine are realizing they must rely solely on themselves.
Budapest memorandum: A bitter lesson
Few countries understand the dangers of unenforced promises like Ukraine does. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine inherited the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, larger than those of the U.K., France and China combined. Under intense international pressure to disarm, Ukraine agreed to surrender its nuclear weapons but only in exchange for security assurances.
Ukraine, under economic pressure and international influence, particularly from the U.S. and Russia, had little room to resist disarmament in the early ’90s. And realistically, its nuclear arsenal at the time would have required a massive investment to maintain and secure.
As the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine, along with Belarus and Kazakhstan, relinquished its nuclear arsenal in return for commitments from Russia, the U.S., and the U.K. to respect Ukraine’s independence and borders, avoid using force or threats and not use economic coercion. China and France offered weaker assurances around the same time.
However, these were political pledges, not legally binding treaties. And when Russia violated them, first by annexing Crimea in 2014, then by launching a full-scale invasion in 2022, the other signatories condemned the actions and provided aid but did not intervene militarily. The takeaway was stark: promises without enforcement are meaningless.
U.S. officials stressed that the memorandum provided “assurances,” not binding “guarantees,” a telling distinction. Unlike NATO members, Ukraine received no automatic military defense.
Even Belarus tried to invoke the Budapest Memorandum in 2013 when the U.S. imposed sanctions. Washington responded that the sanctions targeted human rights abuses by the Belarusian government, and once again reiterated that the memorandum wasn’t legally binding.
NATO membership as a panacea
Having endured two Russian invasions in under a decade, Ukraine is now demanding concrete, legally binding security guarantees, not the vague political promises of the past.
Ukraine’s ideal solution has long been NATO membership, the strongest possible security guarantee. Since the Eastern European country has witnessed many, such as Poland and Baltic nations, joined NATO, why not them? However, it did not work that way.
Since joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1994, Ukraine’s aspirations grew, culminating in the 2008 Bucharest Summit declaration that “Ukraine and Georgia would become members of NATO” under Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, who was a fierce enthusiast of the bloc. Just months later, Russia invaded Georgia.
After Crimea’s annexation in 2014, Ukraine-NATO relations deepened. However, since there was an ongoing conflict in the country, a fact often acknowledged and echoed by Western leaders, the mission became almost impossible. Ukraine’s NATO hopes seemed doomed from the start.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in January, vented his anger over the Budapest Memorandum, saying those who pressured Ukraine into disarmament should be jailed. He accused the signatories of not caring for Ukraine when it truly needed their help.
From NATO to peacekeepers
With NATO membership off the table for now, Ukraine is exploring alternatives such as deploying international peacekeeping forces. The idea, a multinational Western force would act as a buffer between Russian and Ukrainian troops. Europe has backed a “coalition of the willing,” though internal disagreements persist.
So far, only six European countries, including the U.K., France, the Baltic states, and one unnamed nation out of 30, have expressed willingness to send troops. Others remain cautious, questioning the risks: What happens if peacekeepers are attacked?
The Trump administration flatly rejected sending U.S. troops. Russia, predictably, sees the proposal not as peacekeeping but as escalation.
Building security from within
“Those who are reluctant to feed their own army shall feed a foreign army.” Whether this quote belongs to French General Napoleon Bonaparte or someone else, it summarizes the essence of the challenge Ukraine is facing. Rather than relying on others, many argue it makes more sense to accelerate domestic military development, in manpower, equipment, training and defense infrastructure.
Given the unreliable nature of external assurances, Kyiv’s most feasible and effective security guarantee is its own military. Since 2022, Ukrainian forces have held off one of the world’s most powerful militaries, a remarkable achievement.
The Eastern European country currently has approximately 1 million people in arms defending the country against Russia’s invasion. Despite ranking 20th in the world by overall strength, however, the Ukrainian Armed Forces is more than four times larger by manpower than Europe’s next biggest military, France.
Kyiv’s troops may be tired, but also battle-hardened and have unmatched knowledge of the 21st-century battlefield. Indeed, in many areas, they are now setting the standards for others to follow.
In 2025, the overall capacity of the defense industry is expected to reach a new high of $35 billion, up from just $1 billion at the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, according to the Minister for Strategic Industries of Ukraine, Herman Smetanin.
Kyiv now produces around one-third of all weapons, ammunition, and equipment used by the country’s armed forces. In critical areas such as drone production, the figure is now close to one hundred percent.
To sum up, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994 for security promises that proved hollow. Two Russian invasions later, it seeks solid, binding guarantees, whether through NATO, peacekeeping missions or other means. But with limited international backing and an active war on its territory, Kyiv’s most dependable defense is likely to remain its own armed forces. In today’s world, where treaties are often broken and powerful states bend international law, small nations like Ukraine are learning to depend on no one but themselves.