The world is currently undergoing a period of profound geopolitical change and rapid technological transformation. In this era, where global power balances are shifting and the international system is being reshaped, countries are reassessing their strategic positions and potential. In this context, we observe that relations between Türkiye and China have taken on a multilayered character, with consequences not only on a bilateral level but also on a global scale.
For a long time, Ankara and Beijing maintained a type of relationship that was limited to topics confined to their bilateral agenda. Until recently, their perception of each other was shaped by the Cold War mindset and bloc conflicts. Far from serving as a bridge for cooperation, the Uyghur issue has long remained a sensitive fracture between the two countries. For many years, China regarded Türkiye primarily as a strong NATO army and an American ally, while East Asia remained outside Türkiye’s political and economic radar.
However, things are changing. In recent years, new parameters have been added to Turkish-Chinese relations, and these ties are becoming increasingly multilayered and multidimensional. The two sides are now cooperating on pressing global issues such as Ukraine and Palestine; moreover, Turkish and Chinese diplomats are increasingly sitting at the same table in multilateral mechanisms such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
China’s rise, alongside Türkiye’s growing national power and increasing influence in international affairs, is pushing both sides to seek new approaches toward each other. So, in this new period, what could the multidimensional deepening of Türkiye-China cooperation bring to the peoples of both countries and to the world at large?
Unrealized potential
After the COVID-19 pandemic, high-level activity in bilateral relations increased. The visits that began with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s notable trip to China in June 2024 were followed by the visits of Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek. In particular, Fidan’s visit to China stood out as a potential new starting point for bilateral relations. With the trade volume between Türkiye and China exceeding $44 billion by 2023, doubling the 2015 figure, all these visits aim not only to reduce the trade deficit that has formed against Türkiye but also to elevate the total trade volume to a higher level.
On the other hand, the long-planned visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Türkiye is expected to take place within this year. Such a visit by the Chinese leader to Ankara could mark a turning point in bilateral relations, highlighting the change in how the two countries perceive each other.
One of the possible outcomes of this visit should be that both countries aim to elevate their relations to the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership. In contrast to China’s comprehensive strategic partnerships with countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), its relationship with Türkiye has so far remained at a lower level of strategic cooperation. It is clear that this framework falls short of supporting the grand statements and visions expressed in recent times regarding bilateral relations and, at the same time, reveals the deep reservations both sides still hold toward each other despite the great potential.
In terms of the global dimension of bilateral relations, both countries can demonstrate a strengthened partnership in new multilateral platforms that have the potential to offer an alternative to the Western-centric global order. Coordinated diplomacy on hot issues such as Ukraine and Palestine would contribute to regional stability.
Cautious but hopeful
According to professor Liu Zhongmin from the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the spread of Western colonialism turned the Middle East into a de facto colony of the West. According to professor Liu, the strategic autonomy of Middle Eastern countries not only helps these nations protect their own interests but also transforms the Middle East into a key “middle zone” for maintaining stability in the global strategic landscape. Liu Zhongmin highlights that Türkiye has become an essential actor in mediating regional and international conflicts, praising Türkiye’s critical role as a mediator in the Ukraine crisis, particularly in facilitating an agreement on grain transportation in the Black Sea.
In the case of Syria’s reconstruction, both countries could develop joint projects to help improve the Syrian people’s living conditions. However, before this can happen, a consensus between Ankara and Beijing regarding the nature of the newly established regime in Syria needs to be reached.
China’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Fu Cong, emphasized during a U.N. Security Council briefing on Syria earlier this year that China is concerned about the Syrian army granting senior military ranks to fighters from the Turkistan Islamic Party. In this regard, China may seek certain security assurances from the Turkish side. The influence Türkiye holds in Syria presents a geopolitical reality that China cannot ignore. We should also remember that China expressed its gratitude to Türkiye for facilitating the safe evacuation of Chinese citizens from Syria.
This situation also presents a dilemma for China. While Türkiye’s growing strategic autonomy and distancing from Western influence are welcomed in Beijing, Türkiye’s political, cultural and commercial influence – stretching from Central Asia to East Africa and Southeast Asia – may carry long-term signals of competition that could make China uneasy. In particular, China approaches the geopolitical ambitions of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in Central Asia with caution. Additionally, the warm and ceremonious welcome given to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his visit to Indonesia in February attracted significant attention in the Chinese media, underscoring Türkiye’s growing influence in the region.
At this critical juncture in Türkiye-China relations, it is also worth noting that Türkiye’s ambassador to Beijing, Ismail Hakkı Musa, announced his retirement recently with a farewell message. A new ambassador is expected to be appointed soon. Given Ankara’s increasing strategic emphasis on China, the incoming ambassador will face highly significant responsibilities. The profile of the person selected for the Beijing post may offer important clues about the direction of Türkiye’s China policy in this new era. China’s new Ambassador to Ankara, Jiang Xuebin, has officially started his term, and I recently had the opportunity to meet him at a panel. As a young diplomat with a bachelor’s degree in history, he seems genuinely interested in enhancing relations with Türkiye. I believe that under the new ambassador, China will adopt a more nuanced approach toward Türkiye – one that goes beyond an overly security-focused agenda and instead emphasizes deeper political, economic and cultural engagement.
Global South framework
China has been investing in the Global South for the past 25 years and is striving to assume a leadership role in this area. The establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, the launch of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) in 2004, and the creation of the China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum in 2014 are key milestones in this process. In recent years, approaches that evaluate Türkiye-China relations within the framework of the Global South have gained increasing importance.
A Global South framework could further strengthen the mission of Türkiye and China to be the voices of developing countries and pave the way for the two nations to act in greater harmony on global platforms. However, it should be noted that the content and boundaries of the concept of the Global South have yet to reach complete consensus at the international level. The Global South is not an official organization or a political union; instead, it refers to a diverse group of countries with different value systems, cultural traditions, levels of development, and national interests. Nevertheless, specific standard “genetic codes” can be identified within this concept: an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial past, insistence on independent development, advocacy of a multipolar world order, resistance to hegemony and a pursuit of global justice are among these shared characteristics.
At this stage, both sides are approaching their relationship with a largely pragmatic attitude. However, unless this pragmatism is supported by concrete areas of cooperation and deep political trust, it will be difficult for it to transform into large-scale gains. Of course, no bilateral relationship can be built solely on diplomacy and trade. At the foundation of lasting relations between states and the peoples lies the need to increase human-to-human interaction. In the second part of this article, I will continue by discussing not only the impact of advancements in high-tech products on bilateral relations but also offering some suggestions for steps that can be taken in the field of culture.