The recent cessation pause in US intelligence-sharing with Ukraine has created significant pressure on Ukraine’s forces in the Kursk region. The pause also marks a major shift in US-European intelligence cooperation. In the short term, it will make European powers more vulnerable, but it may also create opportunities for developing autonomous European capabilities.
Since 2014, US intelligence has been pivotal to Ukraine’s defense; effectively a pillar in Ukraine’s defense structure. US intelligence has underpinned strategic initiatives against Russian aggression through extensive electronic, satellite, and human intelligence streams.
The pause—and the potential long-term loss—of this support will reduce Ukraine’s effectiveness on the battlefield, highlights the relatively patchy European intelligence coverage that will struggle to step into the American vacuum and raises important and broad questions about what the future of US-European intelligence cooperation will look like.
The intelligence pause by the US administration introduces some uncertainty into transatlantic intelligence relationships that had not been present since WW2.
Whilst the US and European partners have historically maintained robust intelligence exchanges, the recent pause and longer-term disruption in the relationship will create doubts in European partners’ minds about the extent to which they share intelligence, and the viability of European-located transatlantic intelligence fusion centers.
If the US reduces its intelligence cooperation more broadly, the consequences for European security and defense cooperation will be profound: transatlantic security is entirely shared between the US and EU, including in intelligence and command structures. Such a dislocation in intelligence cooperation will introduce a five-year vulnerability to European security, strongly benefiting Russia and China.
– EUROPEAN POWERS’ INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
European powers possess sophisticated intelligence assets, but they also possess critical gaps in comparison to the US. In signals intelligence (SIGINT), European nations like the UK, France, and Germany are capable players.
This can be seen through Britain’s RC-135 Rivet Joint missions, France’s CERES satellites, and Germany’s communication interception operations. These capabilities provide the Alliance essential intelligence but they lack the extensive reach and continuous “real-time” capability of American systems, which operate on a scale several magnitudes greater than their European counterparts.
The UK’s SIGINT efforts, notably, have traditionally depended heavily on US technology and collaboration, making a comprehensive decoupling in this set of intelligence activities particularly challenging.
Human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities within Europe—particularly within the UK’s MI6, France’s DGSE, and Germany’s BND—are well-formed and have a long history of capable and significant operations in Russia, Ukraine, and third-party countries such as China and Iran.
Yet, despite these strengths, Europe’s HUMINT networks essentially function in a triangulation with large-scale American HUMINT operations. If the Americans withhold access to their HUMINT feed, then Europe’s own HUMINT efforts will be diminished and it will take many years and significant resources to scale them up to fill the gap in this kind of intelligence created by American withdrawal.
Satellite imagery and reconnaissance intelligence (IMINT) represent one domain where Europe has demonstrated notable strength, especially through France’s sophisticated Helios and CSO satellites, and the satellite radar imaging capabilities of Germany and Italy.
However, Europe lacks satellite-based infrared early-warning systems essential for missile detection—a critical capability currently monopolized by the US. Europe’s Satellite Centre (SatCen) provides a useful but limited coordinating framework, highlighting both the potential and constraints facing European intelligence integration.
Europeans could effectively collaborate to rapidly scale up an alternative to Elon Musk’s Starlink system. Starlink has been very useful to Ukraine’s defense and the certainty of supply has been questioned since Musk’s public argument with the Polish government.
Given the new intelligence realities in Europe, the concept of a Collective European Intelligence Service is as timely and as relevant as conversations around joint military procurement and a form of European armed forces. A collective intelligence agency-if properly funded and with collective political support-could reduce Europe’s dependence on US intelligence and the uncertainties that are currently present.
Developing a Collective European Intelligence Service will be challenging. Significant financial and political commitments will be necessary to close the technological gap, particularly in real-time intelligence analysis and AI-driven data processing capabilities.
The larger challenges exist in the political realm, where lengthy histories of mistrust in the political, legal and data-sharing realm would need to be overcome quickly for this collective service to work.
The prospect of success in these endeavors will depend on whether the US effectively withdraws from its commitments to NATO. Coordination of intelligence (and security) without the US or NATO structures as clearing houses and structures demands the sort of European political cohesion and mutual trust, that they have not managed to mount before.
The potential withdrawal of US intelligence cooperation and sharing in Ukraine and Europe, highlights the continent’s dependence upon the US, and also the gaps and relatively small size of Europe’s intelligence apparatus.
To develop European intelligence independence requires a large financial commitment, changes to laws and regulations, political cooperation and trust, and the coordination of European industry and academia. If these challenges are overcome, it could be the US that loses out on the influence it has enjoyed over Europe over the previous eighty years.