The seabed has increasingly emerged as a significant and contested domain in recent years, drawing global attention due to unprecedented events and developments. In 2022 alone, incidents such as the breaking of the Svalbard subsea communication cable, the explosion of the Nord Stream 1 & 2 subsea gas pipelines and the breakage of the SHEFA-2 communication cable underscored the vulnerability of underwater critical infrastructure (UCI). This trend persisted into 2023, with similar disruptions affecting subsea communication cables, such as the one connecting Taiwan. Even in 2024, Pakistan had only gone through four incidents of submarine cables, which cost the nation millions of rupees. These events have not only highlighted the fragile nature of UCIs, including oil and gas pipelines, power transmission cables and submarine communication systems, but they have also spurred significant political, military, and scholarly interest in what is now termed “seabed warfare.”
Historically, seabed warfare is not a new concept. Navies have long conducted operations on the seabed, particularly during the Cold War, when the U.S. and the Soviet Union developed extensive acoustic surveillance systems for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and strategic intelligence. Notably, the U.S. Navy’s Operation IVY BELLS in the 1970s involved tapping Soviet subsea cables, yielding critical intelligence. Seabed warfare has evolved into a complex, multi-dimensional field, incorporating advanced technologies and strategies to protect and disrupt Underwater Critical Infrastructure (UCIs), reflecting its growing importance in defensive and offensive naval operations.
The last two decades have witnessed a major boom in the energy distribution sector through the seabed. Various oil and gas pipelines run on the seabed in different oceans, which ensures energy supply among other countries and regions; they hold vital economic importance. Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines transport Russian gas to Europe and run on the seabed of the Baltic Sea. Within Europe, there is also a network of underwater gas pipelines that transport Norwegian gas to the U.K., France, Belgium, Germany, Denmark and Poland. These gas pipelines run on the seabed of the North and Baltic Seas.
In the East, the subsea Ichthys Export Pipeline (Timor Sea) transports gas from the Ichthys field to mainland Australia. Yacheng 13-1 gas pipeline transports gas from the Yacheng gas field to mainland China, and the list goes on. Subsea oil pipelines are also being extensively used to transport oil from offshore terminals to land. According to surveys, the web of 2,381 operational oil and gas pipelines spread across 162 nations back in 2020. Similarly, offshore drilling for new energy resources on the seabed of different oceans around the world is also witnessing a boom. Keeping in view projects such as the Trans Caspian, subsea energy transportation is likely to have an upward trend.
Subsea communication cables also hold significant importance for the world’s economic growth and stability. More than 97% of the world’s internet data flows through the ocean. Let alone subsea communication cables enable money transactions worth $10 trillion per day across the world. Any disruption to these cables is considered socio-economically catastrophic.
Politically, growing subsea connectivity and dependency on energy and information are being considered lucrative foreign policy tools. Subsea pipelines and cables have gained unprecedented strategic importance. Safe operations of subsea pipelines and cables are crucial for socio-economic stability, but at the same time, their blockage and disruption can impose significant strategic effects. New international relations (IR) terms such as ‘pipeline diplomacy’ reflect the same political thought. For military strategists, seabed warfare capability to protect (defensive) and even disrupt (offensive) subsea pipelines and cables has become a priority area. Seabed warfare is inherently attractive for the hybrid military strategy; therefore, it has great potential to grow in “no war-no peace” and “low-intensity conflict” environments.
Defense, offense at the seabed
Based on an analysis of seabed operations in naval history, recent events and development strategies of different navies, the scope of emerging seabed warfare can be divided into benign, defensive and offensive operations. Benign operations will be mainly aimed at oceanographic research, search and rescue (SAR) and salvage operations. Defensive operations will focus on the protection of UCIs. Emerging concepts like Seabed-to-Space Situational Awareness (S3A), Distributed Remote Sensing (DRS), the Great Underwater Wall, etc., will define the framework of defensive seabed operations. Similarly, offensive operations will focus on the destruction or disruption of UCIs and the tapping of digital data flowing through subsea communication cables.
Technological advancements enabled seabed access more than ever. Modern hydro-mechanical systems, advanced electronics and artificial intelligence are enabling the maritime industry to produce ships, submarines and UUVs (uncrewed underwater vehicles) that would carry out activities on the seabed. So where research, exploration and productive machines can go, there will also be military vehicles accessing the seabed to turn it into a new battlefield.
Seabed warfare is a technologically intensive field. Artificial intelligence is reckoned to be the backbone of all enablers of seabed warfare. Enablers of seabed warfare can be divided into three categories: launch platforms (submarines, ships, extra-large UUVs), execution vehicles (UUVs, ROVs, and AUVs) and remote sensors (underwater buoys, ocean data buoys, and air/satellite-based sensors). It is interesting to highlight that there is significant technological progress in each category.
The Belgorod Class Submarine (Russian Navy) is designed to address this requirement for seabed operations. Though U.S. submarines have the capability to carry out similar operations at present, it has decided to develop the VA SSW (Modified Virginia Subsea and Seabed Warfare) submarine. The same trend is followed even by conventional submarines; the latest Swedish A-26 Class submarines have specific features such as rapid and straightforward bottoming and UUV launch and control capability for seabed warfare. The Italian NFS (Near Future Submarine) project and the German-Norwegian Type 212 CD have similar claims. UUV technology is considered the linchpin of seabed warfare.
A long list of special ships will be mainly used for benign and defensive seabed operations. UUVs are becoming more capable in terms of operating depths, endurance, power and propulsion day by day. UUVs are the world’s leading defense companies’ top priority. Data from remote sensors such as underwater hydrophone networks, ocean buoys and even satellites can be fused together for robust surveillance.
As seabed warfare continues to evolve, driven by rapid technological advancements and strategic competition, it is becoming an increasingly sophisticated and high-stakes arena. The development of seabed warfare capabilities, such as the Russian Belgorod Class Submarine and the U.S. Virginia-class submarines, reflects the growing emphasis on controlling this new battlefield. Until clear international rules are established to govern seabed warfare, the potential for conflict in this domain remains significant, with implications for global security and stability. Moreover, in the context of Pakistan, a country with a strategic vicinity and growing dependence on undersea cables, it is imperative to assess its preparedness and resilience against emerging threats of seabed warfare.