The current climate in global politics could prove a ripe ground for Türkiye and the European Union to set aside their differences and join forces in a defense pact after a historic U.S. pivot but any possible security mechanism must be fair, according to an international relations expert.
Europe has reeled from a sudden U-turn in U.S. foreign policy since Donald Trump took office in January and unleashed a series of threats, including disengagement and signals that Washington could abandon its commitment to protect NATO allies on the continent.
Trump cutting off military aid to Ukraine has put the 27 member countries on high alert and the European Commission proposed a $840 billion plan to boost defense budgets across Europe. Fearing a collapse of the transatlantic alliance under Trump, Germany has already passed an unprecedented package boosting defense spending, which could total as much as 1 trillion euros over the coming decade.
Scrambling to work on a new security strategy, European leaders held a series of meetings in Paris, London and Brussels last month, notably also including Türkiye.
Türkiye, with NATO’s second-largest army, a Black Sea coastline and cordial ties with Russia and Ukraine, could play a key role in Europe’s security. Ankara has been quick to warn that European defenses cannot be ensured without its involvement.
“It is inconceivable to establish European security without Türkiye,” President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said after the London summit.
Without Türkiye, “it is becoming increasingly impossible for Europe to continue its role as a global actor,” he added.
Murat Aslan, associate professor at Hasan Kalyoncu University and senior researcher at the Turkish think-tank Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA), believes Türkiye and the EU could “complete one another” in a well-planned security architecture.
“If the security mechanism will be a fair, participative one where the Europeans will not walk away from an issue they consider to be ‘not their problem,’ Türkiye will absolutely stand with the EU,” Aslan told Daily Sabah.
Three key elements emerge in encouraging such a cooperation, according to Aslan, including shared threats, ideological differences and capacity usage.
“Only shared threats can facilitate shared security mechanisms in the international arena,” he said, citing China’s snowballing military and economic power, as well as Russia’s increasing aggression in its invasion of Ukraine, which has kept European nations on guard for over three years now.
“While Europe had a relative spring with Russia before the war, Türkiye was locked in military conflicts with Russia directly and indirectly on several fronts from Syria to Libya,” Aslan argued, adding that Ankara and Moscow have wrestled for regional influence for the past two decades.
He also pointed out a division in the EU where the western flank underestimated the concerns of the eastern countries regarding Russia.
The war in Ukraine has aligned Western and Eastern Europe, Aslan said.
“Now in terms of a common threat, Europe and Türkiye are on the same side. Europe is nowadays following the same policy as Türkiye: strategic autonomy.”
In that vein, Aslan doesn’t believe Türkiye is on a “different ideological lane from Europe.”
“Türkiye has a problem of harmony and unity in its domestic politics,” Aslan said. “Europeans have a democratic courtesy culture which allows their administrations and oppositions to work in harmony during times of crises. That is what Türkiye needs, as well.”
As for capacity, Aslan argued Europe has a “good decade before it can become militarily self-sufficient even if they have upgraded their system.”
Türkiye, in contrast, is subject to constant crises and has maintained a fight against terrorist groups for decades, Aslan said.
The burgeoning Turkish defense industry boasts homegrown tanks, drones, missiles, warships, submarines and many others that have gained traction among EU countries and the U.S., driven by cost-effective solutions, proven battlefield performance and reduced dependency on traditional suppliers.
Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows Türkiye’s share of global arms exports increased by 103% from 0.8% in 2015-2019 to 1.7% in 2020-2024. That makes Türkiye the 11th largest arms exporter globally.
Several European partners are clients of Turkish defense products. Poland was the first NATO country to sign an agreement to buy 24 units of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones from Türkiye in 2021 and last year, Spain agreed to buy 24 Hürjet training aircraft produced by Turkish Aerospace Industries, while the Defence Technologies Engineering Corporation signed an agreement with the Portuguese Navy to build two supply ships.
In a milestone deal, Italian defense giant Leonardo and Turkish drone powerhouse Baykar just last month unveiled a partnership that will see the pair set up a joint company to produce armed drones.
Erdoğan this week received Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto in Ankara, all but cementing what appears to be an Italian effort to bring Türkiye into the European defense cooperation fold.
Europe used to “merely manufacture and sell” their defense products but now they are using them, Aslan continued. “That is why in terms of capacity, EU and Türkiye could complete one another.”
Aslan believes Türkiye doesn’t need Europe, secure in its ability to “fend for itself, so to speak, thanks to its demographic, human resources, economy and defense industry.”
“But,” he warned, “If the Europeans intend to only benefit from Türkiye’s capacity, manpower and military might for their own future while merely entertaining Türkiye on economic and political fronts, including its frozen membership, Türkiye would not tolerate that.”
The EU is bound to establish a military mechanism that will be enough to protect it, Aslan said. “If such a structure is being built in Europe and Türkiye is excluded, that would be a mistake.”