Türkiye’s approach to the PKK conflict has undergone a profound strategic transformation – one that may now be nearing a historic culmination. From the early days of military confrontation to today’s intricate web of political, intelligence and diplomatic tools, Ankara has shifted from counter-force to counter-value and finally, to non-conventional warfare. This evolution is not simply tactical – it represents a comprehensive recalibration of how Türkiye seeks to dismantle the PKK’s influence across multiple geographies.
In this context, Abdullah Öcalan’s Feb. 27, 2025, declaration – urging the PKK and all affiliated entities to disarm and dissolve – cannot be dismissed as a mere symbolic gesture. Though not a direct consequence of Türkiye’s current strategy, his call is inextricably linked to it. The timing and substance of his message reflect the new terrain upon which this conflict now unfolds. The question is no longer whether the PKK can be defeated militarily; it is whether the group can survive politically in an environment where its legitimacy is actively eroded, its international support curtailed and its internal cohesion systematically undermined.
What follows is a strategic race between fragmentation and reinvention. Will the PKK’s leadership coalesce around Öcalan’s message, embracing a non-violent political path within Türkiye’s constitutional framework? Or will splintered cadres, some influenced by spoiler actors such as Iran and Israel, radicalize further, destabilizing both the movement and the region? Türkiye, for its part, has clearly defined its objective: not the annihilation of the PKK by force alone, but its disassembly through controlled internal dissent, diplomatic encirclement and narrative delegitimization.
Events in Syria and Iraq only heighten the stakes. Öcalan’s appeal extended beyond the PKK’s mountain strongholds to include wings across borders, particularly the YPG in Syria and the political diaspora in Europe. This widening dialogue reflects an understanding that the PKK is no longer a singular, territorial insurgency but a diffuse, transnational network embedded in multiple political and military theaters. The developments following Öcalan’s statement reinforce this regional recalibration.
Fragmentation within PKK
On March 1, the PKK announced a unilateral cease-fire but demanded a “legal framework” from Ankara as a condition for permanence. Just days later, on March 10, the YPG’s so-called armed wing SDF signed an eight-point agreement with Syria’s new leadership, outlining a path for integration into the national army and granting local governance rights to regions in the country’s north. The deal also included provisions for Daesh-related cooperation and judicial accountability, suggesting that the architecture of a post-conflict order is already under negotiation.
Yet cracks are visible. YPG leader Ferhat Abdi Şahin, code-named “Mazloum Kobani,” quickly distanced his forces from Öcalan’s call, emphasizing a separate track with the Syrian administration and conditioning progress on reciprocal steps from Türkiye. Meanwhile, Türkiye’s continued military operations in Iraq and elsewhere – while strategically consistent with its security doctrine – risk being perceived as “duplicity” by actors who must be coaxed into political dialogue.
Nonetheless, Türkiye appears fully committed to leveraging these dynamics. Psychological operations aimed at deepening rifts within the PKK, diplomatic coordination with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and cautious engagement with Damascus all point to a coordinated regional strategy. Notably, efforts to implement the Sinjar Agreement with Iraqi and Kurdish authorities suggest that Ankara is prepared to institutionalize its security presence in northern Iraq, even as it negotiates the terms of peace.
What we are witnessing is not a softening of policy but the sophistication of power. Türkiye’s campaign against the PKK has become a political dismantling project – one in which battlefield victories are secondary to the erosion of organizational purpose, credibility and support. Öcalan’s statement, therefore, should not be understood in isolation. It is part of a broader strategic narrative – one that aligns with Türkiye’s domestic imperatives for constitutional reform and its regional ambitions to counterbalance Iran and Israel’s spheres of influence.
The risks are substantial. The fragmented nature of the PKK’s leadership structure could make any unified response elusive. Disagreements over the interpretation and implementation of Öcalan’s call could catalyze not reconciliation, but schism and violence. Similarly, the SDF’s integration into Syria’s central command may be seen by local supporters as a betrayal of Kurdish autonomy, potentially inciting grassroots resistance. In parallel, Ankara’s ongoing military operations may erode trust and reinforce the perception of insincerity, further complicating the engagement calculus.
What can be achieved?
Yet the opportunities are equally historic. The cessation of armed conflict would significantly enhance political stability and security not only within Türkiye but also in northern Iraq and Syria. The withdrawal of PKK elements from Sinjar and Qandil could open new avenues for Turkish-Iraqi rapprochement. The SDF’s integration into the Syrian military may serve both the al-Sharaa administration’s consolidation and Türkiye’s security interests. U.S. backing of the SDF-Damascus agreement further provides a multilateral context in which peace efforts might gain international traction. Perhaps most importantly, the emphasis on democratic reform provides a rare opening for renewed constitutional dialogue within Türkiye – an opportunity to recalibrate domestic politics in the wake of contentious elections and shifting alliances.
Looking forward, three scenarios emerge. The first is a controlled resolution, wherein Öcalan’s line gains traction within the PKK and the SDF’s integration into Syrian structures proceeds incrementally under international supervision. This would preserve the current balance while creating space for gradual reform. The second, more ominous scenario is a return to chaos, marked by renewed radicalism, the collapse of the agreement in Syria, and the breakdown of fragile trust among stakeholders. The third, and most ambitious, is a structural peace, underpinned by legal reforms, disarmament and a durable political settlement, anchoring regional normalization and democratic renewal.
Among the three outlined scenarios, the controlled resolution appears to be the most plausible given current trajectories. Öcalan’s message, while controversial, still holds ideological sway over segments of the PKK’s base, particularly those seeking a political exit from protracted conflict. Türkiye’s “non-conventional warfare” strategy – relying on internal fragmentation, regional diplomacy and psychological operations – indicates a preference for gradual deconstruction rather than total annihilation.
Moreover, the SDF’s incremental integration into Syrian state structures, backed by U.S. support and tolerated by Damascus, suggests that a phased normalization is already in motion. Although the risk of spoilers – particularly from Iran, Israel or hardline PKK factions – remains, they have not yet demonstrated sufficient operational coherence to derail this emerging pathway.
Domestically, Ankara’s push for constitutional reform and post-election recalibration of power may further incentivize a managed political settlement, albeit without the depth required for a fully “Structural Peace.” In contrast, a total breakdown leading to renewed violence – a return to chaos – seems less likely at this stage, though not entirely off the table. Thus, a controlled resolution stands as the most viable and strategically aligned outcome in the near term.
As of 2025, Türkiye stands at a crossroads. The PKK conflict – long a bloody and intractable struggle – may finally be approaching its denouement. Or it may yet mutate into another chapter of instability. The difference will depend not only on military calculus but on the political will to navigate fragmentation, harness diplomacy and institutionalize reform. The coming months will determine whether this moment becomes a missed opportunity or a turning point etched into the annals of regional peace.