One of the most significant characteristics of the liberal world order established under the hegemony of the United States after World War II was the support the American government provided for the European Union. Every American president since the early 1950s has supported the economic and political integration among EU member states. During the Cold War era, the quality of trans-Atlantic relations was always crucial for the U.S. in countering the existential threats posed by the Soviet Union.
The U.S.’ presence in Europe through NATO both legitimized its military security provider role in the continent and helped keep the Soviet Union at bay. Besides, Germany, which had previously sought to establish hegemony in Europe, was continuously kept in check. Under the security umbrella provided by NATO, America’s European allies could easily allocate their limited resources to economic development and societal welfare policies. Thanks to the security guarantees offered by the U.S., Europeans were able to keep military spending at low levels for years, thereby establishing a security community among themselves.
This order, which emerged during the tense and destructive days of the Cold War, persisted in the post-Cold War era as well. Between 1991 and 2008, the U.S. enjoyed unparalleled strength in a unipolar world, and the values it represented were perceived as the most prominent. In the post-Cold War environment, three factors have proved consequential in sustaining the post-modern security community that E.U. member states had built among themselves. On the one hand, Europeans continued importing cheap energy from Russia, while on the other hand, China became an important market and a potential partner for technological cooperation. Additionally, the security protection provided by the U.S. under its global hegemony strategy allowed Europeans to benefit the most from the globalization process.
This situation was made possible by the assumptions that non-Western actors like Russia and China would eventually become part of the rules-based world order and that the U.S. would continue pursuing a global hegemony strategy. However, Trump’s views, expressed both during his first term and before his second presidential campaign, demonstrated that he was not and would not be a typical American president.
Disciplining the allies
Among all U.S. presidents, Trump may be the only one who views the E.U. as a rival or even an adversary. Trump consistently called on America’s traditional allies to spend more on defense, arguing that their free-riding on America’s security guarantees was against U.S. interests. He approached international relations with a transactional perspective, believing that the current system served America’s traditional allies and adversaries more than it benefited the U.S. Skeptical of globalization and internationalization, Trump pursued a conservative-nationalist political agenda, favoring competition among nation-states based on their power capacities. He prioritized bilateral relations over multilateralism and rejected the universalist approach advocating shared values, thereby unsettling America’s traditional allies more than its potential adversaries. His “peace through strength” strategy implied that America would unilaterally impose its strategic preferences on others. Strategic agreements with adversaries like Russia and China could allow the U.S. to disregard the sensitivities of its traditional allies.
Unlike his predecessor, Joe Biden, Trump does not prioritize strengthening democracy globally or dividing the world between liberal democracies and illiberal autocracies. Believing that every country should stand on its own, Trump considers it natural for great powers to have spheres of influence in their respective backyards. He values transactional relationships based on self-benefits, refusing to offer security and prosperity services without getting something in return. Strengthening liberal democracy is not something Trump cherishes at home or abroad. His protectionist economic policies, centered on increasing tariffs in global trade, alarmed not only potential adversaries but also America’s traditional allies. It is well known that Trump dislikes international organizations and multilateral cooperation mechanisms.
Given these factors, Trump’s second term has already made U.S. allies in East Asia and Europe particularly anxious. The liberal, Kantian and post-modern dynamics of the European Union’s integration process seem unlikely to survive in Trump’s world. Some argue that such a Trump-instigated shock is precisely what Europe needs. Russia’s blatant threats to Europe’s security architecture through its invasion of Ukraine, China’s growing assertiveness in reshaping the world order alongside its rising material power, and the U.S.’ reluctance to continue its traditional roles as the global policeman and protector of the liberal world order might awaken the European Union from its prolonged geopolitical slumber. Recognizing that they cannot rely on any global actor, particularly the U.S., for their security and prosperity would/might be a significant gain for Europeans.
Trump’s support for rising far-right populist political parties and movements in Europe is another source of concern for Europeans. The rise of illiberal populist politics across the West, rooted in conservatism, nationalism, traditionalism, sovereignty, protectionism, xenophobia, anti-immigration and anti-globalization, has gained further momentum with Trump’s second presidential victory. Figures like billionaire Elon Musk in Trump’s circle, along with their cordial ties to far-right European politicians such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, have exacerbated the weakening of Europe’s centrist political parties. This trend challenges the foundational values of the European Union.
The possibility of Trump pressuring Ukraine into a dishonorable peace to end the war further fuels suspicions about him across Europe. Trump’s transactional relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his divergence from traditional American security elites regarding Russia’s geopolitical expansion makes him a significant challenge for Europeans. Today, Europeans increasingly acknowledge the necessity of defending themselves against Russia.
Dying trans-Atlantic romanticism
Since the early years of the Cold War era, all American administrations have urged Europeans to allocate more resources to their defense. While these demands for burden-sharing were somehow downplayed during the times when the Soviet threat was considered existential, they were put on the back burner during the unipolar moments of the post-Cold War years when the U.S. appeared to be omnipotent. Following the 2008 global economic crisis and the changing world order from unipolarity to multipolarity, America has increasingly called on its allies to take more responsibility for their defense. Democrats convey these messages politely and diplomatically, while Trump-era Republicans adopt a more commanding and abrasive tone. As of now, 24 out of 32 NATO member countries allocate at least 2% of their GDP to defense. This result owes as much to the Democrats’ encouragement as it does to Trump-era Republicans’ harsh rhetoric.
No one expects Europeans to radically change their long-standing policy of outsourcing their security to the U.S. overnight. Some Europeans believe that Trump’s mindset is temporary and that the U.S. will eventually return to its vision of a rules-based liberal world order. Such a return would undoubtedly be the most beneficial scenario for the European Union.
However, I am not that optimistic. The changes in the U.S. are not temporary but structural. The number of trans-Atlantic elites with a romantic attachment to Europe is declining in America. Meanwhile, the share of global wealth held by rising powers in the non-Western world and the Global South continues to increase. While the world may not be strictly multipolar, it has become multi-actor and multi-centered. “Great power competition” defines this transitional period. In this environment, Europeans must significantly increase their defense spending if they wish to retain America’s traditional security guarantees. If they want the U.S. to protect them against the threats posed by Russia, they need to align more closely with America’s realist and exclusionary foreign policy toward China. It is no longer possible for the U.S. to view Europe through old lenses.
This could actually be an opportunity for Europeans. They know very well that if America wants to succeed against China, it must keep its European allies close. A permanent strategic disengagement of the U.S. from Europe is impossible in such a context. The mutual dependence of Americans and Europeans will persist in the new world order. The most significant recent change is the shift in the balance of power in trans-Atlantic relations in favor of the U.S. Trump clearly sees this as leverage to pressure Europeans. Without balancing the relations, Europeans cannot resist the pressures emanating from the U.S. Thus, the ball is more in Europe’s court than America’s. Europeans must choose between continuing as America’s vassals or awakening from their geopolitical slumber to become equal partners. Otherwise, if they fail to break old habits, they will be destined to become not players but merely the playing field in the competition among great powers.